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PRIVATIZATIONAND INDIGENOUS
OWNERSHIP: EVIDENCE FROMAFRICA
by
J. CRAIG
University of Hudders¢eld
ABSTRACT*: In recent years, privatization has become
common across Africa, reversing the long-term growth in state
ownership of business enterprises. Many have interpreted this as
entailing the abandonment of the developmental objectives that
state enterprises were established to pursue. Others, however,
have suggested that the privatization process can itself provide a
new means through which the same objectives may be achieved.
This article examines the potential for privatization to be used to
promote indigenous ownership. This objective was pursued in
newly independent states across Africa and today remains an
aim of many of the governments undertaking privatization.
The article provides a typology of the range of measures that
can be employed to promote indigenous ownership in the
context of privatization. It examines those used in the Zambian
privatization programme, assessing the degree to which they have
been successful and the obstacles they have faced. Finally, it
concludes with a comparison of the Zambian case with other
African experiences.
1 Introduction
Over the last two decades, privatization has become commonplace
across Africa. According toWorld Bank (2001: 259) data, by the end of
1999 3,529 privatization transactions had occurred across Africawith a
total value of nearly US$8 billion, and, while some governments are
more active than others, in only ten of the ¢fty-threeAfrican countries
had no privatization activity been recorded.The doubts prevalent in the
early and mid-1990s that African governments would deliver on their
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commitments to privatize enterprises have receded, and attention has
increasingly focused on the terms on which enterprises have entered
the private sector.
The pursuit of privatization has generally been interpreted as
entailing the abandonment of existing development objectives by both
proponents and opponents alike. In post-colonial Africa, state
enterprise was one of the main instruments through which
development policy was implemented (Tangri 1999). They provided
governments with a very direct means through which they could
intervene and were often chosen to ful¢l a range of duties such as
establishing new industries, providing employment and controlling
the prices of basic consumer goods. Critics argued that these practices
over-burdened state enterprises and ultimately undermined their
¢nancial and commercial viability (Nellis and Kiken 1989).
Privatization was advocated as a means to free these enterprises from
state control, allowing them to drop their costly non-commercial
objectives and to respond instead to market signals (Boycko et al.
1996). Opponents of privatization shared many of these expectations,
and feared that the sale of state enterprises would entail
redundancies, rising prices and the loss of national control of the
economy (Pitcher 1996; Harsch 2000).
An alternative approach to privatization is presented by Manzetti
(1993), who argued that the adoption of privatization could represent a
change in the means rather than the ends of development policy. If state
enterprises had been established to promote certain objectives, but
consistently failed to achieve them, privatization should not be
interpreted as an abandonment of these goals, but of a discredited
means to achieve them. Manzetti’s analysis raises a number of
interesting research questions. Are the objectives of privatization
those which were previously pursued through state enterprises, or has
there been a narrowing or recon¢guration of these, and what scope is
there for privatization to deliver these objectives?
This paper focuses more narrowly on the potential for government
to use privatization as a means to promote indigenization, the transfer
of economic power to the local population, which has been common
throughout Africa in the post-colonial period. It was promoted
through a range of initiatives, including measures that excluded
foreign owned enterprises from certain economic sectors, provided
new sources of ¢nance to local businesses, and gave preferential
treatment to local businesses in public tendering.These initiatives did
not always prove to be wholly successful and were subject to a range of
constraints (Himbara 1994). Nevertheless, the aspiration to promote
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indigenization continues to be widely held in the era of liberalization
and privatization.While it is sometimes articulated through objectives
such as ‘broadening ownership’or ‘ensuring distributional equity’, it has
also been more forthrightly expressed in the rejection of ‘re-
colonization’ through privatization (Bell 1995; Etukudo 1997).
The next section provides a discussion of privatization and also
presents a typology of the measures that can be used to promote
indigenization. In the following section, some of these methods are
examined in the context of the Zambian privatization programme.
This is an ambitious programme that has succeeded in privatizing the
majority of state enterprises and has been hailed as one of the most
successful in Africa (Campbell White and Bhatia 1998). The success
and failures of the Zambian programme are examined, before the
paper moves on to the concluding section, which places the Zambian
experience in a comparative context.
2 Privatization and indigenization
The term privatization has, and continues to be, subject to a
number of competing de¢nitions. At its broadest it has been conceived
as constituting measures that are aimed to strengthen the private
sector of the economy. In this paper ‘privatization’ is de¢ned more
narrowly as any measure by which the ownership of a state enterprise
is relinquished by the state. Thus, it covers outright sales of state
enterprises as going-concerns or sales of controlling shareholdings in
such companies, as well as measures such as the closure and
liquidation of enterprises. The de¢nition does not, however, include a
range of other actions such as leasing or the granting of management
contracts, which a¡ect the operational control rather than the
ownership of the assets.
It is important to recognize that even within the restricted
de¢nition of privatization that is adopted here, that there are a range
of di¡erent methods through which enterprises may be sold. In the
case of a company wholly owned by the government, the whole interest
could be sold privately to a single purchaser or consortium. On the
other hand, the shares of the company could be sold through a public
o¡ering which would be likely to involve a broader range of smaller
investors. The government might also consider if it wishes to privatize
the company in its current corporate form, or alternatively, whether it
would be preferable to unbundle or split-up the company into a number
of constituent units which could be sold separately. In addition to this,
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the government may undertake a range of measures to a¡ect the
environment in which such sales take place, for example the
promotion of ¢nancial institutions such as stock exchanges and
the creation of competition policy.
To analyse the ways in which these modalities can be used to
address indigenization, a distinction can be drawn between measures
which we can label facilitative, prescriptive and empowering.
Facilitative measures relate to the form in which the enterprise is
o¡ered for sale. For example the decision to unbundle a single large
company into a number of smaller enterprises may allow potential
purchasers with more limited resources to seek its acquisition. A
similar situation is apparent in the case of the public sale of shares as
opposed to the private sale of the entire enterprise.While the resources
to purchase the whole enterprise may be beyond the capacity of most
citizens, the opportunity to buy a small shareholding will be open to
far more. Prescriptive measures relate to those which either
speci¢cally include or exclude certain groups from participating in
the privatization programme. An example of such a measure might
be the decision of a government selling an enterprise to give ¢rst
refusal to the management or the employees of that enterprise and
only if they chose not to proceed with its acquisition would it then be
o¡ered to others. Another measure which could be included within
this group would be directed group ownership, in which a group of
stakeholders is invited to purchase the enterprise. An example of this
is the sale of four Ugandan tea factories which the government chose to
sell to the tea growers who supplied them. Finally, empowering
measures are designed to assist local investors to participate in the
privatization opportunities which are available by ensuring that they
have adequate ¢nancial capacity. Often these will overlap with other
measures which are designed to support and encourage the expansion
of local enterprise, such as the establishment of development ¢nance
institutions and the creation of local capital markets. Other measures
that are speci¢cally related to the privatization process might include
special ¢nancial facilities for indigenous investors to make payments
by instalments rather than in a lump sum.
Despite the di¡erences between each of these approaches, they
each seek to overcome the perceived weakness of the local investors,
either by making assets or shareholdings available in small units
which are more likely to be within their ¢nancial and managerial
reach; by shielding them from competition with foreign capital which
may have greater capacity; or by extending particular assistance to
them to compensate for these shortcomings. As might be expected, it
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has been common to combine a number of these approaches in practice.
However, each type of measure can be seen to address these common
problems from a di¡erent angle, and di¡erentiation between them can
be useful for the analysis of their single and combined e¡ectiveness.
3 The Zambian experience
Privatization ¢rst appeared on the Zambian government’s policy
agenda in 1990 during the Presidency of Kenneth Kaunda. However, it
was not until a change of regime in late 1991 that progress towards
implementation really got underway. Unlike its predecessor, the new
government of President Frederick Chiluba was strongly committed to
implementing a programme of neo-liberal economic reform of which
privatization was a key component. A new and more comprehensive
privatization programme was launched in 1992, which has resulted in
the transfer of the majority of state enterprises into private
ownership. As shown in Table 1, by the end of August 2001, 119
enterprises out of the original portfolio of 144 had been privatized.
Although progress has been most substantial among small and
medium sized enterprises, it has not been restricted to these
categories, and over 70 per cent of large enterprises have also been
privatized.
The only exception to this pattern of privatization is among
enterprises unclassi¢ed by size, a category which consisted of
strategic and utility enterprise. The only enterprise within this
category that has been privatized is the state copper mining
enterprise, Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM) (Craig 2001).
However, the signi¢cance of this level of progress should not be
underestimated. ZCCM was an enterprise of great economic as well as
&CIRIEC 2002
Table 1 – The extent of privatization in Zambia (1992 to August 2001)
Size of state enterprise
Number of enterprises
in original portfolio
Number of enterprises
privatized
Number of remaining
state enterprises
Size unclassified 9 1 8
Large enterprise 27 19 8
Medium enterprise 27 25 2
Small enterprise 81 74 7
Total 144 119 25
Source: Compiled from ZPA (various), Times of Zambia (various), The Post (various), and Reuters
(various).
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symbolic importance, accounting for around ten per cent of gross
domestic product and three-quarters of all foreign exchange earnings.
It can be concluded, therefore, that while some enterprises remain
within state ownership, the overall level of privatization has been
substantial and has a¡ected the core sectors of the economy.
To provide for the implementation of the programme, legislation
was passed in 1992 to create the Zambian Privatisation Agency (ZPA)
which was given a wide range of duties covering both the design and
the implementation of the policy. This legislation has attracted
international attention, and has been praised for creating the ZPA as
an independent agency with extensive powers to execute sales
(Campbell White and Bhatia 1998). While there is much truth in this
characterization, it should also be recognized that the governance of
the ZPA has been the subject of local criticism and that the agency did
require government rati¢cation for its actions in a number of key areas
(Craig 2000).
In the context of indigenization, the framework established for the
privatization programme may be analysed under the headings of
facilitative, prescriptive and empowering measures introduced earlier.
First, in terms of facilitative measures, the legislation allowed the ZPA
great £exibility in designing the method through which enterprises
would be privatized.While outlining a range of possible methods, the
legislation permitted the ZPA to employ any method that it considered
appropriate. In addition, the agency was given the authority to
restructure enterprises before sale, which allowed it to unbundle
larger companies into constituent units. Therefore, the legislation
provided signi¢cant scope for the methods of sale to be adopted which
suited indigenous investors.
Second, although no general restrictions were placed on the
participation of foreign investors in the programme, the Act included
a number of provisions which could be utilized for this purpose.
Firstly, it speci¢ed that bids should be evaluated not only on the basis
of the price that was o¡ered, but also with reference to the
characteristics of the bidder, including their nationality. While this
was only one of a number of factors that had to be considered by the
ZPA, it nevertheless provided scope for a degree of preference to be
given to local bidders. Secondly the £exibility in method of sale also
allowed some scope for prescription through the adoption of methods
such as management and employee buy-outs and directed group
ownership. Finally, the Act provided for the establishment of a
Privatisation Trust Fund. The fund was to act as a warehouse for
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shares in newly privatized enterprises, which would be sold on to
Zambian citizens.
Third, the Act also made provision for empowering Zambian
citizens by enabling them to receive preferential treatment in the
privatization process through a number of mechanisms. Small batches
of shares could be made available to Zambian citizens at a discount,
with further bonus shares issued to those who retained them for the
longer term.While these arrangements were focused on public sales, a
further concession allowed citizens to make payments for either
packages of shares or whole enterprises by instalments, rather than
making the full payment at the time of sale.
Assessing the commitment of a number of African countries to
broadening ownership through privatization, Campbell White and
Bhatia (1998: 113) rated the commitment of the Zambian government
as ‘high’. However, indigenization was not by any means the only, or
even primary, aim of the Zambian programme. Like other countries in
the region, it also pursued privatization to improve public ¢nances,
promote competition and market e⁄ciency, encourage new foreign
investment and to demonstrate to donors a commitment to reform.
Foreign investors, for example, were encouraged to participate in the
privatization programme through access to the bene¢cial terms
o¡ered through Zambia’s investment legislation, the provisions of
which were subsequently made more attractive (Ngenda 1994).
Overall, the privatization programme does appear to have achieved
some success in promoting indigenization, with seventy per cent of sales
reported to have been to Zambian citizens (Business Day 9/6/1999).
However, these sales appear to have been concentrated among the
smaller enterprises and unbundled units of larger companies. In only
one case was a large or medium enterprise privatized intact and
acquired by Zambian investors. However, any attempt to assemble
comprehensive data on who purchased which assets during the course
of the privatization programme confronts a number of problems.While
the fate of the larger enterprises can generally be tracked through a
variety of sources, that of smaller enterprises, unbundled units and
the assets of liquidated companies can be more di⁄cult to follow. In
addition, the identity of the purchaser may not always be easy to
discern, a point that has been raised locally in connection with a
number of transactions. An alternative approach is to begin with an
examination of the method of sale adopted for each enterprise. Such
an analysis provides a useful overview of the extent to which measures
to promote indigenization have been pursued and allows for the
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exploration of the role of facilitative, prescriptive and empowering
measures of indigenization.
Table 2 categorizes the enterprises that have been privatized
according to the method through which this has been achieved.
Overall, most enterprises were privatized intact as going concerns,
and in most cases this was achieved through a private sale. The
balance between di¡erent methods of sale varies considerably between
the di¡erent categories of enterprise. For example, among enterprises
classi¢ed as large or medium sized, unbundling has been as least as
common as the privatization of enterprises in their pre-existing form.
Particularly striking is the absence of any instances of the public
sale of the majority shareholding in any enterprise. In the early stages
of the programme it was expected that around ten enterprises would be
sold through this method.There are a number of reasonswhy this target
has not as yet been achieved, but perhaps one of the most signi¢cant
has been where an existing minority shareholder has held pre-emptive
rights to any shares sold by the government.Typically, these situations
arose where the state enterprise was either established as a joint
venture between the Zambian state and a foreign enterprise, or was
the legacy of Zambia’s ¢fty-one per cent nationalization formula from
the late 1960s.
However, during the privatization programme of the 1990s, these
rights constituted a material constraint as the ZPA had to reach
agreement with the minority shareholders over the terms of the
&CIRIEC 2002
Table 2 – Privatization by method (1992 to August 2001)
Method of privatization
Size
unclassified
Large
enterprises
Medium
enterprises
Small
enterprises Total
Privatized intact ^ 7 10 54 71
Of which:
Public sale ^ ^ ^ ^ ^
Private sale ^ 7 10 42 59
Designated MBO ^ ^ ^ 6 6
Returned to previous owner ^ ^ ^ 6 6
Unbundled 1 7 10 3 21
Liquidated ^ 5 5 17 27
Total 1 19 25 74 119
Source: Compiled from ZPA (various), Times of Zambia (various), The Post (various), and Reuters
(various).
Note: Classifications reflect the judgements of the authorand not necessarily the classifications of the
ZPA. Although unbundling is not in itself a form of divestiture, the difficulties involved in tracing the
resultingassets have led to its treatment as such in this section.
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privatizations. In these circumstance, the ZPA commonly sought to
negotiate an agreement in which provision was made for a minority
interest in the enterprise to be sold through a public sale to Zambian
citizens and ¢nancial institutions.
Chilanga Cement was the ¢rst large-scale enterprise to be divested
in the Zambian programme.The enterprise had, e¡ectively, a monopoly
position. It was the only cement producer in Zambia and was protected
from external competition by the high transportation costs. Chilanga
Cement also had a good record of pro¢tability and met many of the
criteria outlined by the ZPA for an enterprise which could be
privatized through a public sale.
However, Chilanga was not wholly owned by the Zambian
government. While they held nearly sixty per cent of the shares,
signi¢cant minority interests were held by CDC and Anglo American.
An existingagreement between the shareholders, however, provided for
CDCandAngloAmerican to exercise pre-emptive rights over the sale of
anyof the equityheld by the Zambian state.WhenChilanga Cement was
announced as a candidate for privatization, CDC, in consultation with
Anglo American, chose to exercise those rights and entered into
negotiations with the ZPA to acquire a majority holding. In October
1994 agreement was reached; this gave a controlling interest in the
company to CDC, but also transferred 27.4% of the equity to the
Privatisation Trust Fund, to be o¡ered for sale to Zambian citizens
and ¢nancial institutions. The £otation of the company on the Lusaka
Stock Exchange was successfully completed in May 1995.
The ‘Chilanga model’ of a private sale of the majority of a
controlling interest to existing shareholders with pre-emptive rights,
with provision for a public sale of a minority shareholding, proved to
be a popular formula. Overall, such arrangements were the basis for
the privatization agreements for ¢ve of the seven large enterprises and
four of the ten medium enterprises that were sold intact. However, the
completion of these arrangements has encountered a number of
problems. Following the successful sale of shares in Chilanga Cement,
the programme of sales was suspended late 1995 after an o¡er of shares
in Rothmans was undersubscribed. The process resumed with the
successful o¡er of shares in Zambia Sugar in 1996 and the even more
popular £otation of shares in Zambia Breweries in June 1997.
However, the low demand for National Breweries shares in March
1998 brought a renewed suspension to the programme.
Underlying this stop^go approach are a range of factors. For
example, the Zambian Securities and Exchange Commission among
others complained that the minimum number of shares for which
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application could be made has been set at too high a level for many
Zambians to participate, a problem which has been aggravated by the
absence of collective investment vehicles such as unit trusts (The Post
15/8/1996; 5/11/1997). These served not only to exclude a number of
potential investors, but also to restrict the pool of savings that the
sale could tap into. However, even with such arrangements in place,
the potential for participation is limited by the high levels of poverty
in Zambia. As the Government of Zambia (2001: 19) noted, increased
levels of poverty and unemployment have left few households with the
surplus income for investment.
In addition, there are also underlying limitations in the ‘Chilanga
model’ as a method of indigenization. While it does o¡er a valuable
personal investment opportunity for those who can acquire the shares,
it provides little basis for the acquisition of indigenous control of the
company. If the trading price of the shares rises, then those who have
bought shares may be tempted to sell them for a quick pro¢t, and if
wider prescriptive ownership restrictions are not in place, this may
result in the acquisition of the shares by foreign portfolio investors.
Indeed, in cases where companies are taken over, the regulations of
the Lusaka Stock Exchange require that the o¡er is extended to all
shareholders, opening the possibility that the level of indigenous
ownership might decline still further.The potential for such scenarios
has emerged in recent years, with terms for the takeovers of Chilanga
Cement, National Breweries and Zambia Sugar (Times of Zambia
1/3/2001).
As noted earlier, unbundling also featured prominently in the
Zambian privatization programme and provided a potential method
through which indigenous acquisitions could be facilitated. However,
the ZPA faced a number of constraints in the application of this
method. Firstly, the degree to which the unbundling of an enterprise
could be achieved depended partly upon its degree of internal
integration. Generally, this had limited unbundling to companies that
were horizontally diversi¢ed, in sectors such as hotelling, farming and
trading. The rights of existing minority shareholders have also proved
to be a constraint on the ZPA. In the milling sector, for example, it was
planned to unbundle the four state milling companies into ¢fteen
separate enterprises. This was achieved in all but one case, where the
minority shareholder opposed the scheme and the company was
privatized intact.
One potential problem with unbundling is that the government
may secure buyers for the most pro¢table assets, but be left with those
which are less attractive. In the case of the large enterprise, Zambia
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Breweries, the minority shareholder, Anglo American, accepted ZPA
proposals to split the company in two, with the Lusaka Brewery
retaining the name Zambia Breweries and the leading product brand
names, while the Ndola brewery took the name Northern Breweries.
While the new Zambia Breweries was sold to Anglo American and
South African Breweries in 1994, it was a further two years before a
buyer could be found for Northern Breweries. Subsequently, Northern
Breweries experienced di⁄culties in maintaining commercial viability,
and was ¢nally sold to Zambia Breweries in 1999 to prevent its closure
(The Post 2/2/1999).
While the discussion has so far concentrated on facilitative
measures, some prescriptive measures were also employed in the
privatization programme. As outlined in Table 2, six enterprises were
privatized through prescribed management or employee buy-outs.This
related to an initiative launched in 1994, in which the ZPA took the
initiative in o¡ering a number of enterprises directly to their
management. These consisted of a mixture of small enterprises and
unbundled units of larger companies and some of them had previously
been unsuccessfully o¡ered for competitive sale. The success of the
initiative was limited, and of the fourteen small sized enterprises
o¡ered, only six were ¢nally sold to their management. At the time of
the initiative a number of objections had been raised and it was not
subsequently repeated. However, these sales were not the only
management buy-outs that were completed during the course of the
privatization programme, and a number of other agreements have
been completed through competitive private sale.
Attention has frequently been drawn to the failure of the Zambian
¢nancial sector to adequately cater for the medium and longer term
¢nancial requirements of local business. This situation has been
aggravated during the privatization period, with the pursuit of a
tighter monetary policy and the scaling down of the activities of state
owned ¢nancial institutions, such as the Development Bank of Zambia.
In addition, despite the e¡orts of the Zambian Securities and Exchange
Commission, the Lusaka Stock Exchange has played only a minor role
in raising ¢nance for local companies and is dominated by former state
enterprises. Such di⁄culties have adversely a¡ected the ability of
Zambian entrepreneurs to participate, particularly in the di⁄cult
conditions of the structural adjustment.
These problems point to what has perhaps been an imbalance in
the Zambian attempts to promote indigenization through the
privatization process.While a range of facilitative methods have been
pursued, there has been, and remains, inadequate support from
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empowering measures to enable a greater participation of indigenous
investors in the programme. However, this has not been the only
constraint. The existence of pre-emptive rights has reduced the
opportunities available for the government and the ZPA to pursue
facilitative and prescriptive measures, alongside other factors such as
the di⁄cult economic conditions of structural adjustment.
4 Comparative re£ections and conclusion
Many of the issues that have been examined in the context of
Zambia’s privatization programme are re£ected in the experiences of
countries across Africa. Although the categories adopted do not
match those employed in this paper, a broad comparative picture of
the methods of privatization that have been used can be discerned
from data compiled by theWorld Bank (2001: 260).This shows that the
most common form of privatization has been the private sales of
enterprises, and that this has usually been conducted through a
competitive sales process.The liquidation of state enterprises has also
been widespread, while cases involving the public sale of shares
(including minority £otations) have been less common.
No indication is givenof the relative sizes of enterprises which have
been privatized through each method or the characteristics of those
who have bought them. However, some indication of these patterns are
provided by other sources. Reviewing the experience of privatization
across Africa, Harsch (2000) suggests that while most privatization
may have involved local investors, these have tended to be skewed
towards smaller enterprises, with foreign investors dominating the
purchases of larger enterprises. Such a picture provides a fairly
accurate account of the pattern of sales in Zambia and also appears to
be supported by evidence from other cases. Pitcher (1996: 55) reports a
similar pattern in Mozambique, as does Stjernfalt (2000: 21) for Ghana
andTukahebwa (1998) for Uganda.
A variety of factors have contributed to the emergence of these
patterns.While in Kenya and Ghana the problem of pre-emptive rights
held by foreign minority shareholders has been a particularly
signi¢cant factor, more generally the weakness of the indigenous
private sector has limited its ability to acquire enterprises. For
example, both Bennell (1997: 1797) and Makonnen (1999: 7) refer to
cases in which indigenous investors have defaulted on payments when
purchasing enterprises by instalments. Indeed, the frequency of such
situations led the Privatisation Agency in Uganda, in 1995, to give
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preference to bidders o¡ering a single payment, with detrimental
implications for broadening access to ownership. In other cases, the
local investors have successfully purchased enterprises but subsequently
run into problems related to insu⁄cient levels of working capital.
Such instances point to the need to embed privatization programmes
within broader initiatives which nurture the development of local
private enterprise, if indigenization is to succeed. Indeed, research
from other regions suggests that privatization is most likely to be
successful in promoting developmental objectives when it is
integrated into a broader policy framework which support these goals
(Shin 1990; Rodinelli and Iacono 1996). However, as Mkandawire (1994)
and Moshi (1997: 167) have argued, such possibilities have been limited
in many African cases where privatization has been implemented in
pursuit of structural adjustment programmes agreed with the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund. In this context, theWorld
Bank, itself an advocate of broadening ownership, has been
particularly keen to encourage the involvement of foreign investors in
privatization transactions (Cook and Kirkpatrick 1995: 15). Such
constraints have, therefore, limited scope for measures aimed to
promote indigenization, which must be balanced against a range of
other competing objectives.
It is important to recognize, however, that privatization transactions
which successfully transfer enterprises to local ownership can
encounter problems of their own. Indeed, as in the case of the sale of
an enterprise to a foreign buyer, the sale of an enterprise to a local
investor can create controversy over the identity of the buyer. At the
heart of this problem is the highly politicized process of the
development of a business class in many African countries (Tangri
1999). Re£ecting the historic underdevelopment of this class, the
success of its members is often highly dependent on political support
and sponsorship. In the case of Uganda, Tangri and Mwenda (2001)
detail how a number of privatizations were used to transfer assets to
senior political ¢gures and their families on particularly bene¢cial
terms, and similar concerns have been raised in Zambia (Craig 2000),
Burkina Faso (Sawadogo 2000) and Co“ te d’Ivoire (Wilson 1994). In such
circumstances, Tangri and Mwenda (2001: 132^33) argue that
‘privatization has promoted the creation of a tiny wealthy class, rather
than, as was its expressed objective, ‘‘broadening the basis of
ownership’’ among the African population’. While such cases are a
cause for concern, it might be suggested that, even if these assets had
been transferred with the utmost transparency, this would still have
tended to bene¢t a minority of the population. As Ariyo and Jerome
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(1999: 210) observe, the high levels of poverty in much of Africa severely
limits the number of households able to participate in such initiatives.
However, such structural problems should not lead us to under-
estimate the degree to which privatization has provided opportunities
for indigenization. It has been suggested in this paper that these
opportunities can be maximized through initiatives that include a
combination of facilitative, prescriptive and empowering measures,
which are implemented within a policy context that is supportive of
local business development. Indeed, as Africa moves through the
process of privatization, new opportunities for indigenization are
likely to emerge. Returning to the Zambian experience, the case of the
takeover of National Breweries by Zambia Breweries in 1999 provides
an interesting example of this. Although indigenous investors were
only directly involved as minority shareholders in each of these
privatized enterprises, the Zambian Competition Commission
required that four of the ten National Breweries’ plants should be sold
to local entrepreneurs (Times of Zambia 30/4/1999). While on the one
hand this was intended to guard against the monopolization of the
sector, it also provided a new avenue for indigenization. In this respect
it is important to recognize that the process of indigenization is
unlikely to end with the completion of the privatization process and
that there is much which can still be achieved through the active
regulation of the post-privatization environment.
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Privatisation et proprie¤ te¤ indige' ne : Quelques exemples
africains
Au cours des re¤ centes anne¤ es, la privatisation s’est ge¤ ne¤ ralise¤ e en Afrique
inversant la longue tradition de la proprie¤ te¤ publique des entreprises
commerciales. Ceci a e¤ te¤ interpre¤ te¤ par beaucoup comme l’abandon des
objectifs de de¤ veloppement que les entreprises publiques avaient pour
mission de poursuivre. D’autres, en revanche, ont sugge¤ re¤ que le processus
&CIRIEC 2002
PRIVATIZATIONAND INDIGENOUS OWNERSHIP: EVIDENCE FROM AFRICA 575
de privatisation pouvait fournir un nouveau moyen d’atteindre les me“ mes
objectifs. Cet article examine la capacite¤ des privatisations a' promouvoir la
proprie¤ te¤ indige' ne. Cet objectif a e¤ te¤ poursuivi dans plusieurs Etats
inde¤ pendants depuis peu en Afrique et demeure un objectif pour de
nombreux gouvernements engage¤ s dans des processus de privatisation.
L’article fournit une typologie d’un e¤ ventail de mesures susceptibles d’e“ tre
utilise¤ es pour promouvoir la proprie¤ te¤ indige' ne dans un contexte de
privatisation. Il analyse celles utilise¤ es dans le programme de
privatisation en Zambie, e¤ valuant leur degre¤ de re¤ ussite et les obstacles
rencontre¤ s. En guise de conclusion, il compare le cas de la Zambie avec
d’autres expe¤ riences en Afrique.
Privatisierung und Eigentum Einheimischer an
Unternehmen: die Situation in Afrika
In den vergangenen Jahren sind in ganz Afrika Privatisierungen erfolgt.
Damit wurde die langanhaltende Entwicklung der Ausbreitung
staatlichen Eigentums an wirtschaftlichen Unternehmen umgekehrt.
Viele haben dies interpretiert als Aufgabe der Entwicklungsziele, zu
deren Verfolgung staatliche Unternehmen gegrˇndet worden waren.
Andere haben jedoch die Au¡assung vertreten, dass der
Privatisierungsprozess selbst ein neues Mittel sein kann, um eben diese
Ziele zu erreichen. Dieser Beitrag untersucht das Privatisie-
rungspotenzial, das genutzt werden kann, um das Eigentum
Einheimischer an Unternehmen zu f˛rdern. Dieses Ziel wurde in
unabhHngig gewordenen Staaten in ganz Afrika verfolgt, und es ist bis
heute ein Ziel vieler Regierungen geblieben, die Privatisierung betreiben.
Der Beitrag stellt eine Typologie fˇr die Spanne der MaInahmen bereit,
die angewandt werden k˛nnen, um das Eigentum Einheimischer an
Unternehmen im Kontext der Privatisierung zu f˛rdern. Untersucht
werden diejenigen MaInahmen, die im sambischen Privatisierungs-
programm Anwendung fanden, wobei eine AbschHtzung vorgenommen
wird, in welchem Grad sie erfolgreich und welchen Hindernissen sie
ausgesetzt waren. AbschlieIend wird einVergleich des sambischen Falls
mit anderen afrikanischen Erfahrungen vorgenommen.
Privatizacio¤ n y propiedad ind|¤ gena: algunos
ejemplos africanos
En el curso de los u¤ ltimos a•os, los procesos de privatizacio¤ n se han
generalizado en A¤ frica, invirtiendo la larga tradicio¤ n de la propiedad
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pu¤ blica de las empresas comerciales. Muchos han interpretado esto como
el abandono de los objetivos de desarrollo que las empresas pu¤ blicas ten|¤ an
por misio¤ n alcanzar. Otros, sin embargo, han sugerido que los procesos de
privatizacio¤ n pod|¤ an proporcionar nuevos medios con los que alcanzar
los mismos objetivos. Este art|¤ culo examina la capacidad de las
privatizaciones para promover el acceso a la propiedad de los ind|¤ genas.
Este fue un objetivo perseguido por varios Estados africanos tras su
independencia y continu¤ a sie¤ ndolo para algunos gobiernos
comprometidos en procesos de privatizacio¤ n. El art|¤ culo proporciona una
tipolog|¤ a de un conjunto de medidas susceptibles de ser utilizadas para
promover la propiedad ind|¤ gena en un contexto de privatizaciones.
Examina cua¤ les han sido utilizadas en el programa de privatizacio¤ n de
Zambia, evaluando el grado de e¤ xito obtenido y los obsta¤ culos
encontrados. Por u¤ ltimo, concluye con una comparacio¤ n entre el caso de
Zambia y otras experiencias africanas.
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